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Abstract
Detecting anomalous inputs, such as adversarial and out-of-distribution (OOD)
inputs, is critical for classifiers deployed in real-world applications, especially deep
neural network (DNN) classifiers that are known to be brittle on such inputs. We
propose an unsupervised statistical testing framework for detecting such anomalous
inputs to a trained DNN classifier based on its internal layer representations. By
calculating test statistics at the input and intermediate-layer representations of
the DNN, conditioned individually on the predicted class and on the true class of
labeled training data, the method characterizes their class-conditional distributions
on natural inputs. Given a test input, its extent of non-conformity with respect
to the training distribution is captured using p-values of the class-conditional test
statistics across the layers, which are then combined using a scoring function
designed to score high on anomalous inputs. We focus on adversarial inputs, which
are an important class of anomalous inputs, and also demonstrate the effectiveness
of our method on general OOD inputs. The proposed framework also provides
an alternative class prediction that can be used to correct the DNN’s prediction
on (detected) adversarial inputs. Experiments on well-known image classification
datasets with strong adversarial attacks, including a custom attack method that
uses the internal layer representations of the DNN, demonstrate that our method
outperforms or performs comparably with five state-of-the-art detection methods.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved impressive performance on a variety of challenging
machine learning (ML) problems such as image classification, object detection, speech recognition,
and natural language processing [1–4]. However, it is well-known that DNN classifiers can be highly
inaccurate on test inputs from outside the training distribution [5–8]. Such anomalous inputs can arise
in real-world settings either unintentionally due to external factors, or due to malicious adversaries
that intend to cause mis-classifications in the DNN and disrupt the system [9, 10]. In either case, it
becomes critical to have a defense mechanism that can detect such anomalous inputs, and take suitable
corrective action (e.g., abstain from predicting [11, 12] or provide an alternate class prediction).
In this work, we propose ReBeL (Reading Between the Layers), a novel method for detecting
anomalous inputs to a DNN classifier, focusing on the special cases of adversarial [6, 13–16] and
OOD [7,17,18] samples. ReBeL utilizes the rich information at the intermediate layer representations
(activations) of a DNN to obtain a better understanding of the patterns produced by anomalous inputs
for detection. Our method is unsupervised, i.e., it does not utilize a specific class of anomalous
samples for learning or tuning its parameters. While a number of prior works have addressed the
problem of adversarial and OOD detection [19–24], including ones that utilize intermediate layer
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representations of a DNN [20–23, 25–29], some key limitations persist, that we propose to address in
this work.
Limitations of prior work: Detection methods that extract specific properties or attributes from the
layer representations and train supervised classifiers to discriminate anomalous inputs from natural
inputs [19, 22, 23, 29] have to be presented with a broad sampling of anomalous inputs for training,
which assumes prior knowledge of the anomalies (e.g., adversarial attack type and parameters). Such
methods often need to configure hyper-parameters based on the training data (using hold-out or
cross-validation). As a result, they may be effective only against the particular (or similar) types
of anomalies used for training. It has been shown that a majority of the current detection methods
fail to handle unseen and adaptive adversaries that may be aware of the defense mechanism [30, 31].
On the other hand, unsupervised detection methods that are usually based on density (generative)
modeling of the DNN layer representations [19, 26, 28] are not well suited to handle the (often very)
high dimensional layer representations. Finally, we observe that detection methods often do not
use the predicted class of the DNN [23, 29] to focus on class-conditional properties of the layer
representations, which we have found leads to improved detection performance.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We propose a novel framework for unsupervised detection of anomalous inputs to a DNN classifier
that effectively combines class-conditional test statistics extracted from the DNN’s layer repre-
sentations into a statistically-grounded scoring method. The proposed framework is modular in
its choice of test statistics at the DNN layers, which allows scoring methods from a number of
existing works to be used as test statistics (e.g., [23, 32, 33]) 1.
• We show that ReBeL can defend a DNN classifier by simultaneously detecting and providing an
alternate class prediction for inputs detected as adversarial.
• The importance of designing an adaptive defense-aware adversary has been underscored in the
literature [30, 31]. We propose and evaluate against an adversarial attack that focuses on defenses
(such as ours) that use the k-nearest neighbors of the layer representations of the DNN.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In § 2, we provide a background on adversarial and
OOD detection and discuss related works. In § 3, we describe the proposed method, including 1)
test statistics and p-values calculated from the DNN layers (§ 3.2 and § 3.3), 2) scoring methods for
combining the test statistics for adversarial and OOD detection (§ 3.4 and § 3.5), 3) a method for
correcting the class prediction of the DNN on adversarial inputs (§ 3.6), and 4) a multinomial test
statistic derived from the class counts of the k-nearest neighbors of a layer representation (§ 3.7). In
§ 4, we propose a custom attack method for generating adversarial samples that is based on the input
and internal layer representations. Implementation details and experimental results are given in § 5,
followed by conclusions in § 6.
2 Background and Related Work
2.1 Adversarial Attacks
Adversarial attacks may be broadly classified into training-time or data poisoning attacks and test-time
or evasion attacks [10]. Data poisoning attacks focus on tampering with the training set of a learning
algorithm by introducing malicious input patterns that steer the learning algorithm to a sub-optimal
solution, causing degradation in performance [34–36]. Evasion attacks focus on tampering with test
inputs to an already-trained ML model such that the model predicts incorrectly on them. In both
cases, an adversary aims to modify the inputs in such a way that the changes are not easily perceived
by a human or flagged by a detector. For example, a test image of the digit 1 may be modified by
introducing minimal perturbations to the pixels such that a classifier is fooled into classifying it as the
digit 7, while the image still looks like the digit 1 to a human. Our focus in this work is on test-time
evasion attacks.
Given a test input x from class c, adversarial attack methods aim to create a minimally-perturbed
input x′ = x+ δ that is mis-classified by the classifier either into a specific class (targeted attack) or
into any class other than c (untargeted attack). This is formulated as an optimization problem, which
in its most general form looks like
1The code base associated with our work can be found at:
https://github.com/jayaram-r/adversarial-detection.
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min
δ
‖δ‖p s.t.
Ĉ(x+ δ) = c′ (targeted)
or Ĉ(x+ δ) 6= c (untargeted)
A number of adversarial attack methods have been proposed based on this general formulation [6,13–
16, 37–39]. Some of the well-known methods for generating adversarial data include the fast gradient
sign method (FGSM) [13], projected gradient descent (PGD) attack [16], Carlini-Wagner attack [15],
and DeepFool attack [37]. These attack methods can be categorized into white-box or black-box
depending on the extent of their knowledge about the classifier’s structure, parameters, loss function,
and learning algorithm. Most of the commonly used test-time attacks on DNN classifiers are strongly
white-box in that they assume a complete knowledge of the system. For a detailed discussion and
taxonomy of adversarial attack methods, we refer readers to the recent surveys [40, 41].
2.2 Adversarial Defenses
On the defense side of adversarial learning, the focus can be broadly categorized into (1) adversarial
training - where the objective is to train robust classifiers that generalize well in the face of adversarial
attacks [13, 16, 42, 43], (2) adversarial detection - where the objective is to detect inputs that are
adversarially manipulated by identifying signatures or patterns that make them different from natural
inputs seen by the classifier at training time [19, 20, 22, 23]. One approach to adversarial training
involves augmenting the training set of the classifier with adversarial samples created from one or
multiple attack methods along with their true labels, and retraining the classifier on the augmented
training set (possibly initialized with parameters from a prior non-adversarial training) [13]. A
limitation of this approach is that the resulting classifier may still fail on attacks that were not seen by
the classifier during training. This has lead to research in the direction of robust optimization, where
the learning objective of the classifier (usually an empirical risk function) is modified into a min-max
optimization problem, with the inner maximization performed on a suitably chosen perturbation
set (e.g., an l∞ norm ball) [16]. Adversarial detection, on the other hand, does not usually involve
special training or modification of the underlying classifier to predict accurately on adversarial inputs.
Instead, the focus is on methods that can detect adversarial inputs while operating at low false positive
(natural inputs detected as adversarial) rates using ideas from the anomaly detection literature. The
detector flags inputs that are suspicious and likely to be misclassified by the classifier so that they may
be analyzed by an expert (possibly another ML system) for decision making down the line. There
have been a plethora of works on the defense side adversarial learning. Recent surveys on this topic
can be found in [10, 44].
Adversarial Samples as Anomalies
Adversarial detection is closely related to the problem of anomaly or outlier detection [45, 46] with
some important distinctions. The objective of anomaly detection is to determine if an input follows a
pattern that is significantly different from that observed on a given data set. Stated differently, an
input is said to be anomalous if it has a very low probability under the reference marginal distribution
p0(x) underlying a given data set. On the other hand, adversarial inputs from a test-time attack
are not necessarily anomalous with respect to the marginal data distribution because of the way
they are created by minimally perturbing a valid input x ∼ p0(· | c) from a given class c. It is
useful to consider the following notion of adversarial inputs. Suppose a clean input x from class c
(i.e., x ∼ p0(· | c)) is perturbed to create an adversarial input x′ that appears to be from the same class
c according to the true (Bayes) class posterior distribution, i.e., c = arg maxk p0(k |x′). However,
it is predicted into a different class c′ by the classifier, i.e., Ĉ(x′) = arg maxk Fk(x
′) = c′. From
this standpoint, we hypothesize that an adversarial input x′ is likely to be a typical sample from the
conditional distribution p0(· | c) of the true class, while it is also likely to be an anomalous sample
from the conditional distribution p0(· | c′) of the predicted class. We note that Miller et al. [28] use a
similar hypothesis to motivate their detection method.
Supervised vs. Unsupervised Detection
It is useful to categorize adversarial detection methods into unsupervised or supervised based on
whether they use adversarial data (from specific attack methods) for training and optimization.
Supervised methods such as those in prior work [19, 22, 23, 29] usually train a binary classifier
(e.g., logistic regression) to discriminate natural from adversarial inputs using data from specific
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attack method(s), in some cases even tuning hyper-parameters using attack data. This raises the
question of how well such methods can detect inputs from different attack methods not seen during
training, including the case of an adaptive adversary that can intelligently select from a combination
of strong attacks. Also, attack methods often have parameters that control their strength and success
rate, e.g., radius of the perturbation norm ball of FGSM and PGD [13, 16], or the confidence factor of
the Carlini-Wagner attack [15]. Therefore, supervised methods have to be presented with a broad
sampling of attack data, even from a single method, in order to generalize well to new attacks. On
the other hand, unsupervised methods rely solely on patterns observed in a training set of clean
(non-adversarial) data in order to identify test inputs that exhibit anomalous behaviour. Some recent
works in adversarial detection that may be categorized as unsupervised include [21, 24, 26–28, 33].
2.3 Related Works
We categorize and review some prior works on adversarial and OOD detection. A more detailed
survey and taxonomy of anomaly detection methods in deep learning can be found in [47].
Supervised Methods
In Lee et al. [22], the layer representations of a DNN are modeled class-conditionally using multi-
variate Gaussian densities, which leads to the Mahalanobis distance from the mean vector as a layer
feature. The feature vector of Mahalanobis distances from the layers is used to train a binary logistic
classifier for discriminating adversarial (or OOD samples) from natural samples. Ma et al. [23]
propose using the LID of layer representations of a DNN as a feature for characterizing adversarial
samples. Similar to the approach of Lee et al. [22], they calculate a feature vector of LID estimates
from the layer representations, which is used for training a logistic classifier for discriminating
adversarial samples from natural samples. In Yang et al. [29], feature attribution methods are used to
characterize the input and intermediate layer representations of a DNN. They find that adversarial
inputs drastically alter the feature attribution map compared to natural inputs. Measures such as
the inter-quartile range and median absolute deviation are used to quantify the dispersion in the
distribution of attribution values, which are then used as features to train a logistic classifier for
discriminating adversarial samples from natural samples.
Unsupervised Methods
Roth et al. [24] show that log-odds ratio of inputs to a classifier (not necessarily a DNN) can reveal
some interesting properties of adversarial inputs. They propose a test statistic based on the expected
log-odds of noise-perturbed inputs, which is thresholded to detect adversarial inputs. In Zheng et
al. [26], the class-conditional distributions of fully-connected intermediate layer representations are
modeled using Gaussian mixture models 2. Inputs with a likelihood lower than a (class-specific)
threshold under each class-conditional mixture model are rejected as adversarial. In Miller et al. [28],
an anomaly detection method focusing on adversarial attacks is proposed, which in its basic form
can be described as follows. The class-conditional density of the layer representations of a DNN are
modeled using Gaussian mixture models, and they are used to calculate a Bayes class posterior at
each layer. The Kullback-Leibler divergence between the class posterior of the DNN (based on the
softmax function) and the estimated Bayes class posterior from each layer are used as test statistics
for detecting adversarial samples. A number of variations of this test statistic that lead to improved
detection are also proposed. Sastry et al. [33] propose a method for detecting OOD samples based on
analyzing the Gram matrices of the layer representations (activations) of a DNN. The Gram matrices
of different orders (order 1 corresponds to the standard definition) capture the pairwise correlations
between the elements of a layer activation. At training time, their detector records the element-wise
minimum and maximum values of the Gram matrices (of different orders) from a training set of
natural inputs, conditioned on each predicted class. The extent of deviation from the minimum and
maximum values observed at training time is used to calculate a class-specific deviation test statistic
at each layer. The final score for OOD detection is obtained by adding up the normalized deviations
from the layers, where the normalization factor for a layer is the expected deviation observed on a
held-out validation dataset 3.
2Convolutional layers are not modeled in their approach.
3We note that the deviation statistic based on Gram matrices from the layer activations defined by [33] can be used
as a test statistic for ReBeL as well. Different from [33], ReBeL would combine the layerwise, class-conditional
p-values estimated from the test statistics into an adversarial score (§ 3.4) or OOD score (§ 3.5).
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Confidence Metrics for Classifiers
Works such as the trust score [32] and deep KNN [27] have explored the problem of developing a
confidence metric that can be used to independently validate the predictions of a classifier. Inputs with
a low confidence score are expected to be mis-classified and can be flagged as potentially adversarial
or OOD. The deep KNN method [27] uses the class labels of the k-nearest neighbors of DNN layer
representations to calculate a non-conformity score corresponding to each class. Large values of
non-conformity corresponding to the predicted class indicate that an input may not have a reliable
prediction. The method calculates empirical p-values of the non-conformity scores to provide a
confidence score, credibility score, and an alternate (corrected) class prediction for test inputs. The
trust score [32] estimates the α-high density (level) set for each class, and calculates the distances
from a test point to the α-high density sets from the classes to define a confidence metric. These
methods can also be categorized as unsupervised.
3 Proposed Method
A high-level overview of our proposed framework for detecting anomalous inputs is given in Fig. 1.
We first introduce some notations and provide an overview of the problem and our solution approach.
Notations and Definitions: Consider the conventional classification problem where the goal is
to accurately classify an input x ∈ X into one of m classes [m] := {1, · · · ,m}. We focus on
DNN classifiers that learn a function of the form F(x) = [F1(x), · · · , Fm(x)] : X 7→ ∆m ,
where X is the space of inputs to the DNN (e.g., [0, 255]3hw for a h × w color image) and
∆m = {(p1, · · · , pm) ∈ [0, 1]m |
∑
i pi = 1} is the m− 1 probability simplex to which the output
class probabilities are constrained. The multi-layer architecture of a DNN allows the input-output
mapping to be expressed as a composition of multiple functions, i.e., F(x) = (gL◦gL−1 · · ·◦g1)(x) ,
where L is the number of layers. The outputs from an intermediate layer i ∈ {1, · · · , L} of the
DNN fi(x) = (gi ◦ · · · ◦ g1)(x) ∈ Rdi are referred to as its layer representations (or layer
activations) 4. We also use the shorthand notation x(i) := fi(x) for the i-th layer representation
of an input x, with f0(x) = x(0) := x denoting the input for convenience. The decision rule of
the classifier is to predict the class corresponding to the maximum of its output confidence scores,
Ĉ(x) = arg maxc∈[m] Fc(x) . Table 1 provides a quick reference for the terms used in the paper.
Term Description
X ⊂ Rd0 Space of inputs to the DNN.
∆m = {(p1, · · · , pm) ∈ [0, 1]m |
∑
i pi = 1} Space of output probabilities from the m classes.
F(x) = [F1(x), · · · , Fm(x)] : X 7→ ∆m Input-output mapping learned by the DNN.
Ĉ(x) = arg maxi∈[m] Fi(x) Class prediction of the DNN.
x(i) := fi(x) ∈ Rdi , i = 0, 1, · · · , L Flattened layer representations of the DNN; index 0 is used for the input.
C and Ĉ Random variables corresponding to the true class and DNN-predicted class.
Da = {(x(0)n , · · · ,x(L)n , cn, cˆn), n = {1, · · · , N} Labeled dataset with the layer representations, true class, and predicted class.
Tp(x
(l), cˆ) := T
(l)
p | cˆ Test statistic from layer l conditioned on the predicted class cˆ.
Ts(x
(l), c) := T
(l)
s | c Test statistic from layer l conditioned on the candidate true class c.
tp | cˆ := [t
(0)
p | cˆ, · · · , t(L)p | cˆ] Vector of test statistics from the layers conditioned on the predicted class cˆ.
ts | c := [t
(0)
s | c, · · · , t(L)s | c] Vector of test statistics from the layers conditioned on the candidate true class c.
q?(tp | cˆ) Combined p-value of the test statistics conditioned on the predicted class cˆ.
q?(ts | c) Combined p-value of the test statistics conditioned on the candidate true class c.
(k
(l)
1 , · · · , k(l)m ) ∈ {0, 1, · · · , k}m s.t.
∑
i k
(l)
i = k Class counts from the k-nearest neighbors of a representation vector from layer l.‖ · ‖p lp norm of a vector.
d(x,y) Distance between a pair of vectors; cosine distance unless specified otherwise.
Table 1: Notations and Definitions
3.1 Approach Overview
Given a test sample x whose true class c is unknown, we observe its DNN-predicted class Cˆ(x) = cˆ
and representations from selected layers x(l), l = 0, 1, · · · , L. In the most general form, we would
like to design a decision rule of the form
4Layers with tensor-valued outputs (e.g., convolution) are assumed to be flattened into vectors. Boldface symbols
are used for vectors and matrices.
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δ(x(0), · · · ,x(L), cˆ) =
{
1 if S(x(0), · · · ,x(L), cˆ) ≥ τ
0 otherwise
(1)
where S(x(0), · · · ,x(L), cˆ) is the decision statistic or score that is thresholded to decide if a test
sample is anomalous (1) or natural (0). We assume access to a labeled data set D = {(xn, cn), n =
1, · · · , N} that is different from the one used to train the DNN, and that does not contain any anoma-
lous samples. We define an augmented data set Da = {(x(0)n , · · · ,x(L)n , cn, cˆn), n = 1, · · · , N}
that is obtained by passing samples from D through the DNN and extracting their layer-wise repre-
sentations and predicted class Ĉ(xn) = cˆn. Instead of directly using the high-dimensional input and
layer representations, we calculate a test statistic at each layer l (including the input) conditioned on
the predicted class Tp(x(l), cˆ) that captures how anomalous that layer’s representation x(l) is with
respect to the distribution of natural inputs classified into the same class cˆ. Since the true class of an
input is unknown at test time, we also calculate a test statistic at each layer l conditioned on each
candidate value of the true class, Ts(x(l), c), c ∈ [m] . This test statistic captures how anomalous
x(l) is with respect to the distribution of natural inputs from the class c.
We propose to use test statistics that are a function of the samples within a small neighborhood of
a DNN layer representation that capture a local statistical property relative to the class-conditional
distribution of natural inputs (e.g., the average distance from a layer representation to its k-nearest
neighbors from a given class). We do not impose any constraint on the test statistic other than a
basic requirement that larger values of the test statistic correspond to a higher level of nonconformity
relative to the distribution of natural inputs. When clear from the context, we use the shorthand
notation T (l)p | cˆ and T
(l)
s | c to denote the random variables, and t
(l)
p | cˆ and t
(l)
s | c to denote specific values
of the class-conditional test statistics from layer l.
Intermediate
layers
c
c
c
Logits
Class prediction
(argmax)
Class-conditional
Test statistics
Class-conditional
Test statistics
Class-conditional
Test statistics
Class-conditional p-value
estimates
Corrected class prediction
Decision function
Natural
input
Anomalous
input
Figure 1: Overview of the proposed detection framework. The DNN classifies a test input x into
one of the m classes. ReBeL uses the predicted class and the layer representations to calculated
class-conditional test statistics at each layer. The class-conditional test statistics from the layers are
combined into class-conditional p-value estimates, which are then used by the decision function to
determine whether the input is natural or anomalous. ReBeL also provides a corrected prediction for
the true class of the input, which is useful when the input is detected as adversarial.
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Problem Statement: Given a vector of test statistics from the layers tp | cˆ := [t
(0)
p | cˆ, · · · , t(L)p | cˆ] condi-
tioned on the predicted class cˆ, and a vector of test statistics from the layers ts | c := [t
(0)
s | c, · · · , t(L)s | c]
conditioned on each candidate true class c, we would like to design a detection rule of the form Eq. (1)
in order to determine if the test statistics are jointly distributed according to the null hypothesis (of
natural inputs) or the alternative (of anomalous inputs).
Towards this end, we first propose an approach that is based on combining p-values estimated at each
individual layer from the univariate class-conditional distribution of the test statistics. In scenarios
where the number of layers is not large, we include additional p-values estimated from the bivariate
class-conditional distribution of test statistics from all distinct layer pairs. The motivation is that
anomalous inputs are likely to produce distinct patterns at one or more layer representations that
can be detected using the p-values at the layers and layer pairs. We propose a second approach
that is based on considering jointly the vector of test statistics from the layers, and estimating their
multivariate p-values using a non-parametric p-value estimation method from the anomaly detection
literature [46, 48]. In contrast to the first approach, here we implicitly consider the class-conditional,
joint distribution of the test statistics to estimate a single p-value across the layers.
3.2 Testing At Individual Layers & Layer Pairs
The p-value is widely used in hypothesis testing to evaluate how extreme an observed sample is with
respect to the null hypothesis distribution, with smaller values corresponding to stronger evidence
that the null hypothesis is not true [49]. Suppose the test statistic for an input at layer l relative to the
predicted class cˆ is t(l)p | cˆ, and the test statistic relative to each candidate source (true) class c ∈ [m]
is t(l)s | c , then the p-values corresponding to the test statistics are defined for the predicted and each
candidate source class respectively as follows: 5
q(t
(l)
p | cˆ) := Pr[T
(l)
p | cˆ ≥ t(l)p | cˆ | Ĉ = cˆ ]
q(t
(l)
s | c) := Pr[T
(l)
s | c ≥ t(l)s | c |C = c ], c = 1, · · · ,m. (2)
It is straightforward to extend the above definitions for (one-sided, right-tailed) p-values at a pair
of layers l1 and l2 conditioned on the predicted class q(t
(l1)
p | cˆ, t
(l2)
p | cˆ), and each candidate true class
q(t
(l1)
s | c, t
(l2)
s | c), ∀c ∈ [m]. These p-values can, in principle, be calculated for all distinct layer pairs.
However, we recommend including them only when L is small both for computational reasons, and
in order to control the false positive rate (FPR) that could result from a large number of comparisons.
Since the class-conditional distribution of the test statistics is usually unknown, the p-values can be
estimated using the empirical cumulative distribution function of the test statistics observed from a
data sample following the null distribution, with larger samples leading to more accurate estimates 6.
In the single hypothesis test setting, the standard approach is to compare the p-value to a specific
significance level (e.g., 0.01) and reject the null hypothesis when the p-value is smaller than that
level [49]. When multiple tests on the same hypothesis are involved, as in the above problem, rejecting
the null hypothesis based on comparing the p-values to a single significance level can lead to an
increasing FPR as the number of comparisons increases [51]. With the goal of formulating a scoring
function for anomaly detection, we investigate two methods for combining p-values from multiple
tests, viz. Fisher’s method [52] and the harmonic mean p-value (HMP) method [53]. To maintain
clarity, we only describe Fisher’s method here and describe the HMP method in Appendix A.
Combining p-values from multiple tests: The Fisher’s method provides a principled way of com-
bining p-values from multiple independent hypothesis tests based on the idea that, under the null
hypothesis, each p-value is uniformly distributed in [0, 1], and the sum of log of multiple p-values
follows a χ2 distribution [52]. In our problem, the log of the combined p-value from multiple
layers and layer pairs, conditioned on the predicted class and on each candidate true class are given
respectively by,
5We use one-sided, right-tailed p-values because of the way the test statistics are defined.
6We calculate the average p-value from a hundred bootstrap samples in order to reduce the variance. Alternatively,
techniques such as KDE [50] can be used for obtaining smoothed estimates of the p-value.
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log qfis(tp | cˆ) =
L∑
l=0
log q(t
(l)
p | cˆ) +
∑
l1,l2 ∈ [L]2
l2> l1
log q(t
(l1)
p | cˆ, t
(l2)
p | cˆ)
log qfis(ts | c) =
L∑
l=0
log q(t
(l)
s | c) +
∑
l1,l2 ∈ [L]2
l2> l1
log q(t
(l1)
s | c, t
(l2)
s | c), ∀c ∈ [m]. (3)
3.3 Joint Multivariate Testing Of All The Layers
In contrast to the method in § 3.2, here we consider the joint class-conditional distribution of the test
statistics from the layers and estimate a multivariate p-value for a test input. The idea of a multivariate
p-value can be understood in terms of level sets of the joint density of the test statistics under the
null hypothesis of natural inputs. Consider an input predicted into a class cˆ, that has a vector of test
statistics t?p | cˆ from the layers. Suppose f0(tp | cˆ | cˆ) denotes the true (unknown) density of the test
statistics conditioned on the predicted class cˆ, then the region outside the level set of constant density
equal to f0(t
?
p | cˆ | cˆ) is given by {tp | cˆ : f0(tp | cˆ | cˆ) < f0(t?p | cˆ | cˆ)} . The multivariate p-value for
t?p | cˆ is the probability of this region under the null hypothesis measure [46, 48].
We use the averaged localized p-value estimation method using kNN graphs (aK-LPE) proposed by
Qian et al. [48], which is an extension of earlier work [46]. The main idea is to define a score function
based on the distances of a test point to its k-nearest neighbors (kNN) that acts as a surrogate function
capturing the local relative density at the test point. They show that a score function G(x) defined
as the average distance from a point x to its k2 -th nearest neighbor and
3k
2 -th nearest neighbor can
provide an asymptotically-consistent p-value estimator. In our problem, we apply the aK-LPE method
on the vector of test statistics conditioned on the predicted class to estimate the p-value qlpe(tp | cˆ) .
Likewise, we apply the method on the vector of test statistics conditioned on each candidate source
class to estimate the p-values qlpe(ts | c), ∀c ∈ [m]. We note that this method requires a large number
of null-distribution samples in order to provide reliable p-value estimates.
3.4 Scoring For Adversarial Sample Detection
We have all the components required to define the scoring function for adversarial detection in Eq. (1).
First, consider the hypothesis that an adversarial input predicted into a class cˆ by the DNN is likely
to be anomalous at one or more of its layer representations relative to the distribution of natural
inputs predicted into the same class cˆ. This implies that the p-value of the test statistics conditioned
on the predicted class, q?(tp | cˆ)
7, should have a small value. Moreover, since the adversarial input
was created from a source class different from cˆ, it is likely to be a typical sample relative to the
distribution of natural inputs from the unknown source class c 6= cˆ. This implies that the p-value of
the test statistics conditioned on one of the candidate true classes, q?(ts | c), c ∈ [m] \ {cˆ} , should
have a relatively large value. Combining these ideas, the score function for adversarial detection for
an input with predicted class cˆ is given by
S(x(0), · · · ,x(L), cˆ) =
max
c∈[m]\{cˆ}
q?(ts | c)
q?(tp | cˆ)
. (4)
This score function can be used with any of the methods defined earlier for estimating the combined
or multivariate p-value from the layers. It is instructive to consider the numerator and denominator of
the score in the following three cases. 1) For correctly classified inputs, the numerator is expected to
be small and the denominator is expected to be large, resulting in a low score overall. 2) For mis-
classified natural inputs, both the numerator and denominator are expected to be large, resulting in a
mid-range score. 3) For adversarial inputs, the numerator is expected to be large and the denominator
is expected to be small, resulting in a higher score compared to the other cases.
3.5 Scoring For Out-Of-Distribution Sample Detection
OOD inputs are similar to adversarial inputs in that they are also likely to exhibit anomalous patterns
at one or more layers of the DNN relative to the distribution of natural inputs with the same predicted
7We use the notation q?(·) to denote one of the possible p-value functions qfis(·) , qhmp(·), and qlpe(·).
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class. However, an OOD input is not created by intentionally perturbing a natural input with true
class different from the predicted class. Therefore, we modify the score function in Eq. (4) for OOD
detection by including only the denominator term, i.e.,
Sood(x
(0), · · · ,x(L), cˆ) = q?(tp | cˆ)−1. (5)
Anomalous inputs are expected to have a low p-value under the class predicted by the DNN, and
hence a high value for the above score 8.
3.6 Correcting The Classifier’s Prediction
The detector defined in Eq. (1) can be used to monitor test inputs to a DNN and flag inputs that score
above a threshold as potentially adversarial. Given a target FPR of α ∈ (0, 1) (usually a small value
e.g., 0.01), the threshold can be tuned by estimating the FPR on a set of natural inputs as
τα = sup{τ ≥ 0 : P̂F(τ) ≤ α}; P̂F(τ) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
1(S(x(0)n , · · · ,x(L)n , cˆn) ≥ τ), (6)
where 1(·) is the indicator function taking value 1 when its input condition is satisfied. The classifier
provides its prediction when the detection score on an input is below the threshold; this accounts
for a vast majority ( 1 − α fraction) of natural inputs. For inputs that score above the threshold
(i.e., detected as adversarial), we propose to use the class corresponding to the maximum (combined
or multivariate) p-value of the test statistics, conditioned on each candidate source class, as the
corrected class prediction. The combined classification rule of the DNN and the detector is 9:
Ĉcomb(x) =
Ĉ(x) if S(x
(0), · · · ,x(L), cˆ) < τα
arg max
c∈[m]
q?(ts | c) otherwise (7)
3.7 Test Statistics At The DNN Layers
We propose a specific test statistic that captures how well the class counts among the k-nearest
neighbors (kNN) of a layer representation of the DNN follow the expected multinomial class count
distributions estimated from a training set of natural samples. Our experimental results in the main
paper are based on the multinomial test statistic. We present additional methods for calculating test
statistics in Appendix B, and experimentally compare the performance of ReBeL using different test
statistics in Appendix E.5. Recall that Da = {(x(0)n , · · · ,x(L)n , cn, cˆn), n ∈ [N ]} is a set of labeled
samples augmented with the DNN layer representations and the predicted class. The index set of the
k-nearest neighbors of a layer representation x(l) ∈ Rdl relative to the dataset Da is denoted by
N
(l)
k (x
(l),Da) ⊂ [N ] . For brevity, we drop Da from the notation when it is clear from the context.
Multinomial class count based test statistic
If we consider a set of natural inputs to the DNN that are predicted into a class cˆ, the distribution of
class counts from the kNN of its layer representations may be expected to follow a certain distribution
that has a higher probability for class cˆ than the rest. This observation can also be applied to the
natural inputs from a given true class c. Let (k(l)1 , · · · , k(l)m ) denote the tuple of class counts from
the kNN N (l)k (x
(l)) of a layer representation x(l) such that k(l)i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , k} and
∑
i k
(l)
i = k.
The natural or null distribution of the kNN class counts at a layer l conditioned on a predicted class cˆ
can be captured by the following multinomial distribution
p(k
(l)
1 , · · · , k(l)m | Ĉ = cˆ) = k!
m∏
i=1
[pi
(l)
i | cˆ]
k
(l)
i
k
(l)
i !
, (8)
where (pi(l)1 | cˆ, · · · , pi(l)m | cˆ) are multinomial probability parameters (specific to class cˆ and layer l) that
are constrained to lie in the m−1 probability simplex ∆m. These parameters, although unknown, can
8In practice, we compute the natural log of the scores in Eq. (4) and Eq. (5) for numerical stability.
9This is not applicable to general anomalous inputs since they may not be from the predefined set of classes.
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be estimated from the labeled subset of Da predicted into class cˆ, {(x(0)n , · · · ,x(L)n , cn, cˆn), n =
1, · · · , N | cˆn = cˆ} , using the framework of maximum likelihood or maximum-a-posteriori (MAP)
estimation. We use MAP estimation with the Dirichlet conjugate prior distribution [54] and hyper-
parameters (prior count from each class) set to a small nonzero value in order to avoid 0 estimates for
the probability parameters.
If a test input x, classified into class cˆ by the DNN, follows the natural data distribution, we would
expect distribution Eq.(8) to be a good fit for the class counts observed from its kNN at layer l. A
well-known goodness-of-fit test for the multinomial distribution is the likelihood ratio test (LRT),
which computes a log likelihood ratio as the test statistic [55]. In order to test whether the observed
class counts (k(l)1 , · · · , k(l)m ) from layer l, given predicted class cˆ, is consistent with distribution (8),
the LRT test statistic is given by
Tp(x
(l), cˆ) =
m∑
i=1
k
(l)
i log
k
(l)
i
k pi
(l)
i | cˆ
. (9)
This test statistic is always non-negative, with larger values corresponding to a larger deviation from
the null distribution Eq.(8).
In a similar way, the natural or null distribution of the kNN class counts at a layer l conditioned on a
true class c can be captured by the following multinomial distribution
p(k
(l)
1 , · · · , k(l)m |C = c) = k!
m∏
i=1
[pi
(l)
i | c]
k
(l)
i
k
(l)
i !
. (10)
The LRT test statistic corresponding to this multinomial distribution is given by
Ts(x
(l), c) =
m∑
i=1
k
(l)
i log
k
(l)
i
k pi
(l)
i | c
. (11)
Since the true class of a test input is unknown, we calculate this test statistic for each candidate true
class c ∈ [m]. Although we use the LRT test statistic as a class count deviation measure, we do not
rely on its asymptotic properties such as convergence to the χ2 distribution (when scaled by the factor
−2), which would not be applicable in our scenario where k is a small integer.
4 Defense-Aware Custom Attack
The importance of evaluating an adversarial detection method against an adaptive, defense-aware
adversary has been highlighted in prior works [30, 31, 56]. We consider a gray-box adversary that is
assumed to have full knowledge of the DNN architecture and parameters, and partial knowledge of
our detection method 10. The adversary can utilize this knowledge to create adversarial samples that
attempt to simultaneously induce mis-classifications in the DNN and evade the detection method.
Towards this end, we formulate a differentiable loss function along the lines of prior work [15, 57]
that uses the input and internal layer representations of the DNN to create adversarial samples.
Consider a clean input sample x from class c that is correctly classified by the DNN. Let ηl denote
the distance between x(l) = fl(x) (the l-th layer representation of x) and its k-th nearest neighbor
from layer l. The number of samples from any class i among the k-nearest neighbors of x(l), relative
to the labeled dataset Da, can be expressed as
k
(l)
i =
N∑
n=1 : cn=i
s(ηl − d(fl(x), fl(xn))), i = 1, · · · ,m, (12)
where s(·) is the unit step function. Consider the following probability mass function over the class
labels: pi = ki /
∑m
j=1 kj , i ∈ [m] , where ki =
∑L
l=0 k
(l)
i is the kNN count corresponding to
class i summed over the layers. In order to fool defense methods relying on the kNN class counts
from the layer representations, our attack attempts to find an adversarial input x′ = x + ζ with
target class c′ 6= c that minimizes the following log-ratio of probabilities:
10For example, the detection threshold and specific layers of the DNN used may be unknown.
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log
pc
pc′
= log kc − log kc′ = log
L∑
l=0
k(l)c − log
L∑
l=0
k
(l)
c′ , (13)
subject to a penalty on the norm of the perturbation ζ. To address the non-smoothness arising from
the step function in the class counts, we use the Gaussian (RBF) kernel r(x,y, σ) = e−
1
σ2
d(x,y)2
to obtain a smooth approximation of the class counts in Eq.(12) 11. The attack objective function to
minimize is obtained by combining the kernel-smoothed log-ratio of probabilities with a penalty on
the l2 norm of the perturbation, i.e.,
J(ζ) = ‖ζ‖22 + λ log
L∑
l=0
N∑
n=1 :
cn=c
r(fl(x+ ζ), fl(xn), σ
2
l ) − λ log
L∑
l=0
N∑
n=1 :
cn=c
′
r(fl(x+ ζ), fl(xn), σ
2
l ),
(14)
where σl > 0 is the scale of the kernel for layer l and λ > 0 is a constant that sets the relative
importance of the terms in the objective function. Details of the optimization method and the choice
of λ can be found in Appendix D.5. The method used for setting the kernel scale per layer and minor
extensions of the proposed attack can be found in Appendix C. In our experiments, we choose the
class with the second highest probability predicted by the DNN as the target attack class.
5 Experimental Results
We evaluated ReBeL on the following well-known image classification datasets: CIFAR-10 [59],
SVHN [60], and MNIST [61]. We used the training partition provided by the datasets for training
standard CNN architectures. We perform class-stratified 5-fold cross validation on the test partition
provided by the datasets; the training folds are used for estimating the detector parameters, and the
test folds are used solely for calculating performance metrics (which are averaged across the test
folds). We used the Foolbox library [62] for generating adversarial samples from the following
attack methods: (i) Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) with l∞ norm [16], (ii) Carlini-Wagner (CW)
attack with l2 norm [15], and (iii) Fast gradient sign method (FGSM) with l∞ norm [13]. We also
implement and generate adversarial samples from the custom attack proposed in § 4. More details on
the datasets, DNN architectures, and the attack parameters used are provided in Appendix D. Due to
space constraints, we omit the results related to MNIST and FGSM, and present them in Appendix E.
We compare the performance of ReBeL (using Fisher’s method and the aK-LPE method combined
with the multinomial test statistic) against the following recently proposed methods for adversarial
and OOD detection: (i) Deep Mahalanobis detector (Mahalanobis) [22], (ii) Local Intrinsic Dimen-
sionality detector (LID) [23], (iii) The odds are odd detector (Odds) [24], (iv) Deep kNN (DKNN) [27],
and (v) Trust Score (Trust) [32]. Mahalanobis and LID methods are supervised (they utilize
adversarial or outlier data from the training folds), while the remaining methods are unsupervised.
LID and Odds are excluded from the OOD detection experiment because they specifically address
adversarial samples. Details on the implementation, hyper-parameters, and layer representations used
by the methods can be found in Appendix D.4.
We evaluate detection performance using the precision-recall (PR) curve [63, 64] and the receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curve [65, 66]. We use average precision as a threshold-independent
metric to summarize the PR curve, and partial area under the ROC curve below FPR α (pAUC-α) as
the metric to summarize low-FPR regions of the ROC curve.
5.1 Detecting Adversarial Samples
Figures 2 and 3 plot the average precision of the detection methods as a function of the perturbation
l2 norm of the adversarial samples generated from the CW and Custom attack methods. For the PGD
attack, the proportion of adversarial samples is shown instead of the perturbation norm because most
of the samples produced by this attack have the same norm value. We observe that across (almost)
all cases, ReBeL outperforms the other baselines. Methods such as Mahalanobis, Odds, and DKNN
perform well in some cases but fail on others, while LID performs poorly in nearly all scenarios. We
observe an outlying trend in Figure 3b, where Odds outperforms ReBeL on the custom attack applied
11A similar approach has been used, e.g., in the soft nearest-neighbor loss function [58].
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Figure 2: Adversarial detection performance on CIFAR-10.
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Figure 3: Adversarial detection performance on SVHN.
to SVHN. However, a comparison of the pAUC-0.2 metric (Figure 7 in Appendix E.2) for this scenario
reveals that ReBeL has higher pAUC-0.2 for low perturbation norm (where adversarial samples are
likely to be more realistic and harder to detect). We provide additional results in Appendix E that
include: (i) evaluation of the pAUC-0.2 metric, (ii) results on MNIST, and (iii) results on FGSM.
5.2 Detecting Out-Of-Distribution Samples
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Figure 4: OOD detection performance.
Figures 4b and 4c compare the performance of ReBeL with Mahalanobis, DKNN, and Trust on two
OOD detection tasks. Details of the experimental setup are provided in Appendix D.3. The plots show
average precision and pAUC-0.05 as a function of the proportion of OOD samples 12. Observe that
ReBeL outperforms the unsupervised methods DKNN and Trust in both cases, but does not achieve
12We report pAUC below 5% FPR because the methods achieve high detection rates at very low FPR.
12
the near-perfect performance of Mahalanobis. Note that Mahalanobis is a supervised method
that uses outlier samples from the training folds to train a classifier and tune a noise parameter [22].
However, in real-world settings, it is unlikely that one would have prior knowledge or sufficient
number of outlier samples for training.
5.3 Corrected Classification Performance
In Table 2, we present the accuracy of the combined classification rule proposed in § 3.6 (with
Fisher’s method and the multinomial test statistic) compared against the corrected class prediction
of DKNN [27] on both clean data and adversarial data generated using the CW attack. The detection
threshold is set using Eq. (6) for target FPRs of 0.5% and 2%. We observe that ReBeL achieves a
reasonable accuracy in most cases, which is notable because the accuracy of the DNN would be close
to 0 without any defense mechanism. Also, ReBeL significantly outperforms DKNN in all cases.
Dataset Method
Accuracy (%),
Clean data
Accuracy (%),
CW, confidence = 0
Accuracy (%),
CW, confidence = 6
Accuracy (%),
CW, confidence = 14
α = 0.5% α = 2% α = 0.5% α = 2% α = 0.5% α = 2% α = 0.5% α = 2%
CIFAR-10 ReBeL 95.01 94.93 47.57 52.67 22.39 26.51 25.24 28.41
Deep kNN 95.47 95.40 1.78 19.54 0.46 6.38 0.74 8.56
SVHN ReBeL 89.79 90.12 45.72 63.26 33.53 47.36 39.16 56.19
Deep kNN 89.46 89.57 0.22 1.25 0.22 1.37 0.23 1.57
MNIST ReBeL 98.94 98.84 87.02 88.86 80.21 82.64 84.89 86.74
Deep kNN 99.01 98.66 1.05 4.54 1.14 5.23 1.12 4.93
Table 2: Corrected classification performance of ReBeL and DKNN.
6 Conclusion
We presented ReBeL, an unsupervised framework for detecting anomalous inputs to a DNN classifier
that is based on joint statistical testing of the DNN layer representations. We proposed specialized
scoring methods for detecting adversarial and OOD inputs. In the case of adversarial inputs, we also
proposed an effective method for correcting the class prediction of the DNN. The construction of
ReBeL is modular, allowing it to be used with a variety of test statistics calculated at the DNN layers.
Through extensive experiments with strong adversarial attacks and anomalous inputs to DNN image
classifiers, we have shown that ReBeL outperforms several recent competing methods.
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Appendix
A Harmonic Mean p-value Method
The harmonic mean p-value (HMP) [53] is a recently proposed method for combining p-values from
a large number of dependent tests. It is rooted in ideas from Bayesian model averaging and has
some desirable properties such as robustness to positive dependency between the p-values, and an
ability to detect small statistically significant groups from a large number of p-values (tests). In our
problem, the inverse of the weighted harmonic mean of the p-values from multiple layers and layer
pairs, conditioned on the predicted class and on each candidate true class, are given respectively by
qhmp(tp | cˆ)
−1 =
L∑
l=0
wl q(t
(l)
p | cˆ)
−1 +
∑
l1,l2 ∈ [L]2
l2> l1
wl1,l2 q(t
(l1)
p | cˆ, t
(l2)
p | cˆ)
−1
qhmp(ts | c)
−1 =
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l=0
wl q(t
(l)
s | c)
−1 +
∑
l1,l2 ∈ [L]2
l2> l1
wl1,l2 q(t
(l1)
s | c, t
(l2)
s | c)
−1, ∀c ∈ [m]. (15)
The weights wl and wl1,l2 should be non-negative such that they sum to 1; they can be used to
incorporate any prior knowledge about the relative importance of different layers and layer pairs. In
practice, we set all the weights to be equal.
In our experiments, we found the HMP method to have comparable or slightly worse performance
compared to the Fisher’s method of combining p-values (§ 3.2). This is surprising given the simplistic
assumption of independent tests made by Fisher’s method. We conjecture that Fisher’s method
achieves better detection at the expense of a higher FPR, while the HMP method has a more
conservative detection rate with a lower FPR. To maintain clarity in the experiments, we only report
results based on Fisher’s method.
B Test Statistics at the DNN Layers
In section § 3.7, we presented the multinomial test statistic which is based on class counts from the
k-nearest neighbors of a DNN layer representation. To demonstrate the generality of the proposed
method, we present and evaluate three additional test statistics that are also based on local statistical
properties calculated from the k-nearest neighbors of a DNN layer representation. For this discussion,
we define the following additional terms. Let
X (l)c = {x(l)n , n ∈ [N ] : cn = c}, c ∈ [m]
define the set of representations from layer l corresponding to samples labeled into class c. Similarly,
let
X˜ (l)c = {x(l)n , n ∈ [N ] : cˆn = c}, c ∈ [m]
define the set of representations from layer l corresponding to the samples predicted into class c.
Binomial class count based test statistic
This is a specialization of the multinomial test statistic, wherein instead of focusing on the kNN
counts from all classes, we focus on the kNN count from a particular class (either the predicted class
or a candidate true class). Consider an input x with layer representations x(l), l = 0, 1, · · · , L and
predicted class cˆ. Let k(l)cˆ ∈ {0, 1, · · · , k} be the number of k-nearest neighbors from class cˆ for
the representation x(l) from layer l. This count can be interpreted as the number of successes k(l)cˆ
in a Binomial distribution with k trials. We define the binomial test statistic given a class c as the
proportion of k-nearest neighbors that are not from the same class c. The test statistics at layer l
conditioned on the predicted class cˆ and on each candidate true class are defined respectively as,
Tp(x
(l), cˆ) =
k − k(l)cˆ
k
,
Ts(x
(l), c) =
k − k(l)c
k
, ∀c ∈ [m]. (16)
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The test statistics are bounded to [0, 1] and measure the non-conformity of the class labels among
the k-nearest neighbors of a layer representation, with larger values corresponding to a larger non-
conformity. We note the similarity of this test statistic with the non-conformity score computed by
the deep KNN method [27], with a key difference that deep KNN calculates a single non-conformity
score (per class) by summing the non-conforming class counts across the layers.
Trust Score based test statistic
The trust score was proposed by Jiang et al. [32] as a confidence score for a classifier that indicates
when the classifier’s prediction on a test input is likely to be correct. We first provide an informal
definition of the α-high density set Hα(f) for α ∈ [0, 1] and a continuous density function f as
– the set of all points with density larger than a certain value λα such that 1 − α fraction of the
probability mass is contained in Hα(f) (refer to Jiang et al. [32] for the formal definition). Given a
set of points Xc from each class c ∈ [m], the trust score estimates the α-high density set Ĥα(fc)
for each class-conditional density fc, c ∈ [m] using the kNN distances of points from Xc. For the
special case of α = 0 the density level-set estimate reduces to the set of all points from class c,
i.e., Ĥ0(fc) = Xc.
Given a test input x that is predicted into class cˆ by the classifier, the trust score associated with the
classifier’s prediction on x is defined as [32]
ξ(x, cˆ) =
min
i∈ [m]\{cˆ}
dhaus(x, Ĥα(fi))
dhaus(x, Ĥα(fcˆ))
,
where dhaus is the Hausdorff distance, which in this case reduces to the nearest neighbor distance
dhaus(x,X ) = miny∈X d(x,y) between a point x and a set X . In other words, the trust score is
the ratio of the minimum distance from a point to the α-high density set of a class different from
the predicted class, to the distance from a point to the α-high density set of the predicted class. The
score is non-negative and unbounded above, with larger values indicating a higher level of trust or
confidence in the classifier’s prediction.
For an input x with representation x(l) at layer l and predicted class cˆ, we define the test statistic
conditioned on the predicted class as the inverse of the trust score
Tp(x
(l), cˆ) =
dhaus(x
(l), X˜ (l)cˆ )
min
i∈ [m]\{cˆ}
dhaus(x
(l), X˜ (l)i )
(17)
so that an anomalous inputs (with a low trust score) will have a large values for this test statistic.
Note that we use the special case of the trust score with α = 0 for simplicity. The set X˜ (l)cˆ is a
representative sample of layer representations from the class-conditional density given the predicted
class Ĉ = cˆ. Similarly, the test statistics at layer l conditioned on each candidate true class are
defined as
Ts(x
(l), c) =
dhaus(x
(l),X (l)c )
min
i∈ [m]\{c}
dhaus(x
(l),X (l)i )
, ∀c ∈ [m]. (18)
In this case, the set X (l)c is a representative sample of layer representations from the class-conditional
density given the true class C = c.
Local Intrinsic Dimensionality based test statistic
Local intrinsic dimensionality (LID) at a point provides an indication of the dimension of the sub-
manifold containing the point that would best fit the distribution of data in a local neighborhood of
that point [67, 68]. For a formal definition of LID in terms of the cumulative distribution function of
the distance from a point to other points from the same distribution, the reader is referred to prior
works [23, 69]. In practice, LID is estimated from the distances of a point to its k-nearest neighbors
using ideas from extreme value theory. We use the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) of LID
from Amsaleg et al. [69] that is also used in the work of Ma et al. [23] to estimate the LID of DNN
layer representations. Consider a point x whose distances to its k-nearest neighbors from a set of
points X are denoted by ri(x,X ), i = 1, · · · , k. The MLE estimate of LID from Amsaleg et al. [69]
is given by
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L̂ID(x,X ) = −
(
1
k
k∑
i=1
log
ri(x,X )
rk(x,X )
)−1
.
For an input x with representation x(l) at layer l and predicted class cˆ, we define the test statistics
based on LID conditioned on the predicted class cˆ and on each candidate true class as
Tp(x
(l), cˆ) = L̂ID(x(l),X (l)cˆ ),
Ts(x
(l), c) = L̂ID(x(l),X (l)c ), ∀c ∈ [m]. (19)
We expect anomalous inputs to the DNN to produce test statistics (LID values) that are larger than
that observed on natural inputs, as observed by Ma et al. [23] on adversarial inputs.
Combining Multiple Test Statistics.
We note that it is straightforward to include more than one test statistic per-layer in the framework
of ReBeL. For example, the multinomial, binomial, and trust score based test statistics could be
calculated at each layer, resulting in a test statistic vector of length 3 (L + 1). With this change,
the method for estimating p-values from the test statistics, either combined or multivariate, and the
scoring function for adversarial and OOD detection do not require any modifications. Combining
multiple test statistics in this way could be an approach to improving the detection performance
of ReBeL, with some increase in the computation. It may also be argued that it is harder for a
defense-aware adaptive attacker to generate adversarial samples that can evade a detector based on
multiple test statistics at the DNN layers.
In Appendix E.5, we provide results comparing the performance of ReBeL with the test statistics
defined here on the adversarial detection task.
C Details and Extensions of the Custom Attack
C.1 Setting the Kernel Scale
The scale of the Gaussian kernel for a given clean input x and for each layer σl determines the
effective number of samples that contribute to the soft count approximating the k-NN counts in Eq.
(14). Intuitively, we want the kernel to have a value close to 1 for points within a distance of ηl (the
k-NN radius centered on fl(x)), and decay rapidly to 0 for larger distances. Suppose Nk(fl(x))
is the index set of the k nearest neighbors of fl(x) from the l-th layer representations, then the
probability of selecting the k nearest neighbors is given by
h1(σl) =
∑
n∈Nk(fl(x))
e
− 1
σ2
l
d(fl(x),fl(xn))
2
N∑
n=1
e
− 1
σ2
l
d(fl(x),fl(xn))
2
.
We could choose σl to maximize this probability and push it close to 1. However, this is likely to
result in a very small value for σl, which would concentrate all the probability mass on the nearest
neighbor. To ensure that the probability mass is distributed sufficiently uniformly over the k nearest
neighbors we add the following normalized entropy term as a regularizer
h2(σl) =
1
log k
∑
i∈Nk(fl(x))
qi(σl) log
1
qi(σl)
,
where
qi(σl) =
e
− 1
σ2
l
d(fl(x),fl(xi))
2
∑
j ∈Nk(fl(x))
e
− 1
σ2
l
d(fl(x),fl(xj))
2 .
Both terms h1(σl) and h2(σl) are bounded to the interval [0, 1]. We set a suitable σl by maximizing
a convex combination of the two terms, i.e.,
max
σl∈R+
(1− α)h1(σl) + αh2(σl). (20)
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We set α to 0.5 in experiments and use a simple line search to find the approximate maximizer of Eq.
(20).
C.2 Untargeted Attack
The formulation in § 4, where a specific class c′ 6= c is chosen, is used to create a targeted attack.
Alternatively, a simple modification to Eq. (13) that considers the log-odds log pc1−pc of class c can
be used to create an untargeted attack, resulting in the following objective function to be minimized:
J(ζ) = ‖ζ‖22 + λ log
L∑
l=0
N∑
n=1 :
cn=c
r(fl(x+ ζ), fl(xn), σ
2
l ) − λ log
L∑
l=0
N∑
n=1 :
cn 6=c
r(fl(x+ ζ), fl(xn), σ
2
l )
C.3 Alternate Loss Function
Starting from equation Eq. (13), but now assuming that the probability estimate for a particular class
c (based on the k-NN model) factors into a product of probabilities across the layers of the DNN
(i.e., independence assumption), we get
log
pc
pc′
= log
kc
kc′
= log
∏
l k
(l)
c / k∏
l k
(l)
c′ / k
=
L∑
l=0
log k(l)c −
L∑
l=0
log k
(l)
c′ .
Using the soft count approximation based on the Gaussian kernel (as before) leads to the following
alternative loss function for the targeted custom attack
J(ζ) = ‖ζ‖22 + λ
L∑
l=0
log
N∑
n=1 :
cn=c
r(fl(x+ ζ), fl(xn), σ
2
l ) − λ
L∑
l=0
log
N∑
n=1 :
cn=c
′
r(fl(x+ ζ), fl(xn), σ
2
l )
In contrast to Eq. (14), this loss function considers the class probability estimates from each layer
instead of a single class probability estimate based on the cumulative kNN counts across the layers.
A similar modification can be applied for the untargeted attack as well.
D Additional Implementation Details
D.1 Computing Platform
Our experiments were performed on a single server running Ubuntu 18.04 with 128 GB memory, 4
NVIDIA GeForce RTX 2080 GPUs, and 32 CPU cores.
D.2 Datasets & DNN Architectures
A summary of the image classification datasets we used, the architecture and test set performance
of the corresponding DNNs are given in Table 3. Each dataset has 10 image classes. We followed
recommended best practices used for training DNNs on image classification problems. We did
not train a DNN on the Not-MNIST dataset because this dataset is used only for evaluation in the
out-of-distribution detection experiments.
Dataset Input dimension Train size Test size Test Accuracy Architecture
MNIST [61] 28× 28× 1 50,000 10,000 99.12 AlexNet [70]
SVHN [60] 32× 32× 3 73,257 26,032 89.42 2 Conv. + 3 FC layers
CIFAR-10 [59] 32× 32× 3 50,000 10,000 95.45 ResNet-34 [71]
Not-MNIST [72] 28× 28× 1 500,000 18,724 N/A N/A
Table 3: Datasets & DNN Architectures.
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D.3 OOD Detection Experiment Setup
We evaluated OOD detection using the following dataset pairs: 1) MNIST images as in-distribution
and Not-MNIST [72] images as out-distribution (outlier), 2) CIFAR-10 images as in-distribution and
SVHN images as out-distribution. As before, we used stratified 5-fold cross-validation and calculated
the average performance metrics from the test folds. We compared the performance of ReBeL with
Mahalanobis, DKNN, and Trust; Odds and LID are excluded from this experiment because they
mainly focus on adversarial detection. For ReBeL, we used Eq. (5) with p-values calculated using
both Fisher’s method and the aK-LPE method. Since Mahalanobis is a supervised method, it uses
both in-distribution and out-distribution data from the training folds, while the remaining methods
(all unsupervised) use only the in-distribution data from the training folds. To promote fairness in
the comparison, we excluded out-distribution data from one half of the classes from the training
folds, and included out-distribution data from only the excluded classes in the test folds. Additionally,
in the test folds we included image samples with pixel values randomly generated from a uniform
distribution with the same range as the valid images. The number of random samples is set equal to
the number of test fold samples from a single class.
D.4 Method Implementations
The code associated with our work can be accessed here 13. We utilized the authors original
implementation for the following methods: (i) deep mahalanobis detector 14, (ii) the odds are odd
detector 15. We implemented the remaining detection methods, viz. LID, DKNN, and Trust, and
this is available as part of our released code. All implementations are in Python3 and are based on
standard scientific computing libraries such as Numpy, Scipy, and Scikit-learn [73]. We used
PyTorch as the deep learning and automatic differentiation backend [74]. We perform approximate
nearest neighbor search using the NNDescent method [75] to efficiently construct and query from
kNN graphs at the DNN layer representations. We used the implementation of NNDescent based on
the library PyNNDescent 16. Our implementation of ReBeL is highly modular, allowing for new test
statistics to be easily plugged in to the existing implementation. We provide implementations of the
following test statistics: (i) multinomial class counts, (ii) binomial class counts, (iii) trust score, (iv)
local intrinsic dimensionality, and (v) average kNN distance.
In our experiments with ReBeL, where Fisher’s method or HMP method are used for combining the
p-values, we included p-values estimated from the individual layers (listed in Tables 4, 5, and 6) and
from all distinct layer pairs. The number of nearest neighbors k is set to be a function of the number
of samples n using the heuristic k =
⌈
n0.4
⌉
. For methods like DKNN, LID, and Trust that use k,
we found that setting k in this way produced comparable results to that obtained over a range of k
values. Therefore, to maintain consistency, we set k for all the (applicable) methods using the choice
k =
⌈
n0.4
⌉
.
For the method Trust, we applied the trust score to the input, logit (pre-softmax) layer, and the fully-
connected layer prior to the logit (pre-logit) layer. Since it was reported in Jiang et al. [32] that the trust
score works well mainly in low-dimensional settings, we applied the same dimensionality reduction
that was applied to ReBeL (see Tables 4, 5, and 6) on the input and pre-logit layer representations.
We found the pre-logit layer to produce the best detection performance in our experiments. Hence,
we report results for Trust with the pre-logit layer in all our experiments. The constant α, which
determines the fraction of samples with lowest empirical density to be excluded from the density
level sets, is set to 0 in our experiments. We explored a few other values of α, but did not find a
significant difference in performance. This is consistent with the observation in Section 5.3 of [32].
The methods Mahalanobis and LID train a logistic classifier to discriminate adversarial samples
from natural samples. The regularization constant of the logistic classifier is found by searching (over
a set of 10 logarithmically spaced values between 0.0001 to 10000) for the value that leads to the
largest average test-fold area under the ROC curve, in a 5-fold stratified cross-validation setup.
For the method Odds, the implementation of the authors returns a binary (0 / 1) detection decision
instead of a continuous score that can be used to rank adversarial samples. The binary decision
13https://github.com/jayaram-r/adversarial-detection
14https://github.com/pokaxpoka/deep_Mahalanobis_detector
15https://github.com/yk/icml19_public
16https://github.com/lmcinnes/pynndescent
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is based on applying z-score normalization to the original score, and comparing it to the 99.9-th
percentile of the standard Gaussian density. Instead of using the thresholded decision, we used the
z-score-normalized score of Odds in order to get a continuous score that is required by the metrics
average precision and pAUC-α.
Details on the DNN Layer Representations
The DNN layers used in our experiments and their raw dimensionality are listed for the three datasets
in Tables 4, 5, and 6. An exception to this is the LID method, for which we follow the implementation
of Ma et al. [23] and calculate the LID features from all the intermediate layers. For DKNN and
LID, we did not apply any dimensionality reduction or pre-processing of the layer representations
to be consistent with the respective papers. For Mahalanobis, the implementation of the authors
performs global average pooling at each convolutional layer to transform a C ×W ×H tensor (with
C channels) to a C-dimensional vector.
For ReBeL, we use the neighborhood preserving projection (NPP) method [76] to perform dimen-
sionality reduction on the layer representations. We chose NPP because it performs an efficient
linear projection that attempts to preserve the neighborhood structure in the original space as closely
as possible in the projected (lower dimensional) space. Working with the lower dimensional layer
representations mitigates problems associated with the curse of dimensionality, and significantly
reduces the memory utilization and the running time of ReBeL. The original dimension, intrinsic
dimension estimate, and the projected dimension of the layer representations for the three datasets
are listed in Tables 4, 5, and 6. We did not apply dimension reduction to the logit layer because it has
only 10 dimensions.
Layer Layerindex
Original
dimension
Intrinsic
dimension
estimate
Projected
dimension
Input 0 784 13 31
Conv-1 + ReLu 1 21632 22 53
Conv-2 + Maxpool + Dropout 2 9216 18 77
FC-1 + ReLu + Dropout 3 128 9 90
FC-2 (Logit) 4 10 6 10
Table 4: Layer representations of the DNN trained on MNIST. The output of the block listed in the first column
is used as the layer representation.
Layer Layerindex
Original
dimension
Intrinsic
dimension
estimate
Projected
dimension
Input 0 3072 18 43
Conv-1 + ReLu 1 57600 38 380
Conv-2 + ReLu + Maxpool + Dropout 2 12544 42 400
FC-1 + ReLu + Dropout 3 512 12 120
FC-2 + ReLu + Dropout 4 128 7 10
FC-3 (Logit) 5 10 4 10
Table 5: Layer representations of the DNN trained on SVHN. The output of the block listed in the first column is
used as the layer representation.
The procedure we used for determining the projected dimension is summarized as follows. We used
the training partition of each dataset (that was used to train the DNN) for this task in order to avoid
introducing any bias on the test partition (which is used for the detection and corrected classification
experiments). At each layer, we first estimate the intrinsic dimension (ID) as the median of the LID
estimates of the samples, found using the method of Amsaleg et al. [69]. The ID estimate dint is used
as a lower bound for the projected dimension. Using a 5-fold stratified cross-validation setup, we
search over 20 linearly spaced values in the interval [dint, 10 dint] for the projected dimension (found
using NPP) that results in the smallest average test-fold error rate for a standard k-nearest neighbors
classifier. The resulting projected dimensions are given in Tables 4, 5, and 6.
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Layer Layerindex
Original
dimension
Intrinsic
dimension
estimate
Projected
dimension
Input 0 3072 25 48
Conv-1 + BatchNorm + ReLU 1 65536 33 330
Residual block-1 2 65536 58 580
Residual block-2 3 32768 59 590
Residual block-3 4 16384 28 28
Residual block-4 5 8192 15 15
2D Avg. Pooling 6 512 9 9
FC (Logit) 7 10 8 10
Table 6: Layer representations of the ResNet-34 trained on CIFAR-10. The output of the block listed in the first
column is used as the layer representation.
Note on Performance Calculation
The following procedure is used to calculate performance metrics as a function of the perturbation
norm of adversarial samples. Suppose there are Na adversarial samples and Nn natural samples in a
test set, with N = Na +Nn. Define the maximum proportion of adversarial samples pa = Na /N .
The adversarial samples are first sorted in increasing order of their perturbation norm. The proportion
of adversarial samples is varied over 12 equally-spaced values between 0.005 and min(0.3, pa). For
a given proportion pi, the top Ni = dpiNe adversarial samples (sorted by norm) are selected. The
perturbation norm of all these adversarial samples will be below a certain value; this value is shown
on the x-axis of the performance plots. The performance metrics (average precision, pAUC-α etc.)
are then calculated from the Ni adversarial samples and the Nn natural samples.
In order to calculate the performance metrics as a function of the proportion of adversarial or
OOD (anomalous) samples, the only difference is that we do not sort the anomalous samples in a
deterministic way. For a given proportion pi, we select Ni = dpiNe anomalous samples at random
uniformly, and calculate the performance metrics based on the Ni anomalous and Nn natural samples.
To account for variability, this is repeated over 100 random subsets of Ni anomalous samples each,
and the median value of the performance metrics is reported. Note that the detection methods need to
score the samples only once, and the above calculations can be done based on the saved scores.
D.5 Details on the Adversarial Attacks
We list below the parameters of the adversarial attack methods we implemented using Foolbox [62].
We utilize the same variable names used by Foolbox in order to enable easy replication.
• FGSM: max_epsilon=1, p_norm = inf
• PGD: epsilon = [ 1255 , 3255 , · · · , 21255] stepsize = 0.05, binary_search = False,
iterations = 40, p_norm = inf
• CW: confidence = [0,6,14,22], max_iterations = 750, p_norm = 2
For the adversarial detection experiments in § 5.1, we reported results for the attack parameter setting
that would produce adversarial samples with the least perturbation norm in order to make the detection
task challenging. This corresponds to epsilon = 1 / 255 for the PGD attack, confidence = 0
for the CW attack, and max_epsilon = 1 for the FGSM attack (the only parameter value used).
The adversarial data are generated once from the clean data corresponding to each training fold and
test fold, and saved to files for reuse in the experiments. This way there is no randomness arising
from the adversarial samples.
Custom Attack:
Here we provide additional details on the custom attack method proposed in § 4. The constant λ in
the objective function controls the perturbation norm of the adversarial sample, and smaller values of
λ lead to solutions with a smaller perturbation norm. We follow the approach of Carlini et al. [15]
to set λ to the smallest possible value that leads to a successful adversarial perturbation. This is
found using a bisection line search over ten steps. An adversarial input is considered successful if it
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modifies the initially-correct class prediction of the defense method (given by Eq. (7) for ReBeL).
We also follow the approach of Carlini et al. [15] to implicitly constraint the adversarial inputs to
lie in the same range as the original inputs using the hyperbolic tangent and its inverse function.
Suppose the inputs lie in the range [a, b]d, the following sequence of transformations is applied to
each component of the vectors
zi = tanh
−1(2
xi − a
b− a − 1)
z′i = zi + wi
x′i = (b− a)
1
2
(1 + tanh(zi + wi)) + a
effectively allowing the perturbation w to be optimized over Rd. The resulting unconstrained
optimization is then solved using RMSProp for tuning gradient descent with adaptive learning
rate [77]. We set the maximum number of gradient descent steps to 1000. In our experiments
throughout the paper, the custom attack targets the variant of ReBeL based on Fisher’s method and
the multinomial test statistic.
E Additional Experiments
E.1 Results on the FGSM Attack
Figure 5 presents the average precision of the different detection methods as a function of the l2 norm
of perturbation for the FGSM attack method. It is clear that both variants of ReBeL outperform the
other methods, consistent with the trend observed on other attacks in § 5.
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Figure 5: Average precision on the FGSM attack for all datasets.
E.2 Evaluation of Partial Area Under the ROC Curve
Here we compare the performance of methods using pAUC-0.2, a metric calculating the partial area
under the ROC curve for FPR below 0.2. Comparing the area under the entire ROC curve can lead to
misleading interpretations because it includes FPR values that one would rarely choose to operate in.
Therefore, to reflect realistic operating conditions, we chose a maximum FPR of 0.2. Recall that for
the PGD attack we vary the proportion of adversarial samples along the x-axis because most of the
samples from this attack have the same perturbation norm.
On the CIFAR-10 dataset (Figure 6), we observe that ReBeL has better performance than the other
methods in most cases. On the custom attack, Mahalanobis has slightly better performance than
ReBeL with the multivariate p-value estimation method (aK-LPE). We make similar observations on
the SVHN dataset (Figure 7), with a minor exception on the custom attack where the Odds method
performs better than ReBeL as the perturbation norm increases.
On the MNIST dataset (Figure 8), we observe some different trends in the performance. On the
CW and FGSM attacks, the methods Odds and Trust perform comparably or slightly better than
ReBeL (particularly the variant based on Fisher’s method). On the custom attack, the performance of
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Figure 6: CIFAR-10 experiments: pAUC-0.2 for different attacks.
ReBeL based on Fisher’s method decreases significantly as the perturbation norm increases. On the
other hand, the variant of ReBeL based of the aK-LPE method outperforms the other methods on this
attack. We think that this contrast in performance is due to the fact that the custom attack samples
were optimized to fool the variant of ReBeL based on Fisher’s method. Also, attack samples with
higher perturbation norm are more likely to be successful. On the PGD attack, Odds outperforms
the other methods, but the pAUC-0.2 of all methods, except LID and DKNN, are higher than 0.95 in
this case. We conjecture that the good performance of most methods on MNIST could be due to the
simplicity of the space of image inputs and the classification problem.
E.3 Results on the MNIST Dataset
In Figure 9, we compare the average precision of different methods on the MNIST dataset for the
CW, PGD, and custom attacks (results for the FGSM attack were presented in § E.1). We observe
that Odds has good performance on this dataset, outperforming ReBeL in some cases. The method
Trust (which uses the pre-logit, fully connected layer) also performs well on this dataset. This could
be due to the fact that on the MNIST dataset, the attack samples exhibit very distinctive patterns at
the logit and pre-logit DNN layers, which are the focus of the methods Odds and Trust. We note
that Odds and Trust do not carry over this good performance to all datasets and attacks. Also, both
variants of ReBeL perform well in the low perturbation norm regime.
E.4 Comparison of Running Time
Table 7 reports the wall-clock running time (in minutes) of the different detection methods per-fold,
averaged across all attack methods. Trust consistently has the least running time, while both variants
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Figure 7: SVHN experiments: pAUC-0.2 for different attacks.
of ReBeL have low running time as well. The running time of Mahalanobis is comparable to ReBeL
on MNIST and SVHN, but is higher on CIFAR-10. This is because Mahalanobis performs a search
for the best noise parameter at each layer using 5-fold cross-validation, which takes a longer time on
the Resnet-34 DNN for CIFAR-10. Odds and LID have much higher running time compared to the
other methods. For each test sample, Odds computes an expectation over noisy inputs (from a few
different noise parameters), which increases its running time as the size of the DNN increases. The
computation involved in estimating the LID features at the DNN layers increases with the sample
size used for estimation and the number of layers.
Dataset ReBeL, Fisher ReBeL, LPE Mahalanobis Odds LID DKNN Trust
CIFAR-10 2.73 2.18 15.08 142.94 49.74 11.99 0.5292
SVHN 6.37 5.01 4.19 33.60 100.80 23.54 0.60
MNIST 0.92 0.85 1.18 6.79 6.96 1.73 0.24
Table 7: Average wall-clock running time per-fold (in minutes) for the different detection methods.
The computational cost of ReBeL at prediction (test) time can be roughly expressed as
O(L (dmaxNρ + m2 + BN)) when layer pairs are not used, and O(L2 (dmaxNρ + m2 + BN))
when layer pairs are used. Here dmax is the maximum dimension of the projected layer represen-
tations, m is the number of classes, N is the number of samples, B is the number of bootstrap
replications used for estimating p-values, and ρ ∈ (0, 1) is an unknown factor associated with the
approximate nearest neighbor queries (that are sub-linear in N ). We note that the p-value calculation
can be made faster and independent of N by pre-computing the empirical (class-conditional) CDF of
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Figure 8: MNIST experiments: pAUC-0.2 for different attacks.
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Figure 9: MNIST experiments: average precision for different attacks.
the test statistics per layer. For DNNs with a large number of layers, we recommend not calculating
p-values from the layer pairs.
E.5 Performance of ReBeL with Different Test Statistics
The performance of ReBeL (using Fisher’s method) with the four test statistics proposed in § 3.7 and
Appendix B is compared on the CIFAR-10, SVHN, and MNIST datasets in Figures 10 through 12.
The plots show average precision as a function of the perturbation norm for the CW, Custom, and
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Figure 10: Average precision of ReBeL with different test statistics on CIFAR-10.
FGSM attacks, and average precision as a function of the proportion of adversarial samples for the
PGD attack. Notably, the test statistic based on LID performs poorly in all cases. On CIFAR-10
and SVHN, the binomial and trust score based test statistics have comparable performance to the
multinomial test statistic on all except the custom attack, on which the multinomial based test statistic
performs better. We observe a different trend on the MNIST dataset, where the trust score and
binomial based test statistics perform better than the multinomial test statistic, notably on the custom
attack.
E.6 Performance Improvement From Class Conditioning
Here we empirically show that calculating class-conditional (instead of marginal) attributes at the
DNN layers can lead to performance improvement for an existing adversarial detection method
LID [23]. In the work of Ma et al. [23], the LID estimates of the DNN layer representations are based
on mini-batches of samples drawn from the marginal data distribution. Instead, we propose to use
the DNN predicted class of a test sample, and estimate LID at the layers relative to samples drawn
from the predicted class (i.e., the class-conditional distribution). Figure 13 plots the average precision
and pAUC-0.2 metrics comparing the performance of LID with its class-conditional extension on
four attack methods applied on the CIFAR-10 dataset. It is clear that the class-conditional extension
has a notable improvement in performance on all except the PGD attack (where the performance is
comparable).
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Figure 11: Average precision of ReBeL with different test statistics on SVHN.
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Figure 12: Average precision of ReBeL with different test statistics on MNIST.
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Figure 13: Average precision and pAUC-0.2 of the class-conditional extension of LID for different
attacks on CIFAR-10.
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